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ABSTRACT 
This research paper considers how the criminal law can be used to modify corporate behaviour 
from both a theoretical and practical perspective. It suggests companies should be able to be 
indicted for manslaughter and looks at the difficulties that need to be overcome to enable this 
to happen. First it looks at the current law in New Zealand and suggests that the fact a 
company cannot be prosecuted for manslaughter is problematic as it limits the responses that 
can be taken against a company when a death occurs. The paper then looks at the 
developments that have occurred in this area in the United Kingdom and its two Law 
Commission Reports. 
The final section considers what approach New Zealand should take. In considering this 
question it draws on the United Kingdom's expenence and concludes that the law of 
manslaughter needs to apply to both corporates and individuals. It suggests that the recent 
Privy Council decision Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission 
[1995] 3 NZLR 7 will overcome many of the earlier problems experienced when attributing 
criminal liability to a corporation. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, abstract and footnotes) comprises 
approximately 1294 words 
/ 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Should a company be prosecuted ror manslaughter? 
New Zealand has not yet chosen to address the issue of whether corporations should be 
criminally liable for manslaughter. 1 However, other jurisdictions have not been so reticent. 
Companies like individuals, are capable of committing a large number of varied offences and 
the challenge for the law is how to best hold them responsible for their transgressions . This is 
particularly important when a company has indulged in risk taking behaviour that has caused 
others to suffer harm. Companies can be responsible for acts that cause death but in New 
Zealand this cannot constitute manslaughter. 
Individuals have always faced criminal prosecutions if they fail to discharge the appropriate 
standard of care. Yet a company, often in the pursuit of profits, that fails to discharge the 
appropriate standards of safety is more likely to find itself subject to regulatory sanctions for 
breaches of health and safety legislation when a death occurs. These are normally strict liability 
regulatory offences which are not considered to be felonies . This approach has the effect of 
decriminalising conduct simply because it has occurred in an industrial setting. 
In 1997 a young pilot who had been charged with offences under the Civil Aviation Act 1990 
was represented by Les Atkins QC, a former Law Commissioner and member of the 1991 
Casey Committee. Mr Atkins has expressed concern that the role of the airlines, aircraft 
owners and the Civil Aviation Authority are not examined closely enough when pilots are put 
before the criminal courts following accidents . 
'Casey, Report on the Crimes Consultative Committee 1991 and the Report of S1r Duncan McMulhn to the Minister of Justice on sections 155 and 156 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 . Wellington 1995. In the last seven years New Zealand's law of manslaughter has been placed under review in two reports the first of which 
recommended a company should be able to be convicted of homicide in certain circumstances No action was ever taken on this recommendation Since then 
debate has largely centred on what degree of negligence must be proved, either the failure to take reasonable care, or gross negligence. The debate appears to 
have been largely decided by Parliament 's implementation of some of the recommendations of the McMullin Report which increased the degree of negligence 
required for manslaughter arising from a breach of duty to gross negligence.(Sect1on 2 of the Crimes Act Amendment Act 1997) 
4 
Atkins suggests that blaming pilots who survive may help mask the true reasons for a crash and 
suggests that a crime similar to that of corporate killing proposed by the British Law 
Commission may be necessary to ensure that justice is done. He suggests that in some 
circumstances blaming the pilot ". . . may not only be unjust . .. but it may turn eyes away from 
where the real difficulties are, which may be systems errors or organisational problems which 
are ultimately the responsibility of the operator. "
2 
New Zealand's failure to look at law reform in this area is exacerbated by the fact that Supreme 
Court first looked at whether a company could be convicted of manslaughter in 1969
3
. The 
conclusion ultimately reached by the Court of Appeal was that technically such a prosecution 
was feasible but could not be proceeded with because of the wording of section 158 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 . 4 It did not exclude the possibility of a company being prosecuted as a 
secondary party although this has not come to pass, nor did it rule out a prosecution taking 
place in circumstances in which a corporation failed to discharge its legal duties and a death 
occurred. 
However, despite the auspicious beginning New Zealand legislators have chosen not to reopen 
the issue even when the dictum of Henry Jin the Supreme Court was cited with approval in the 
landmark case DPP v P & 0 European Ferries (Dover) Ltcf . 
Given developments overseas New Zealand needs to look at corporate criminal liability in 
general and corporate manslaughter in particular. This essay will argue that the offence of 
manslaughter needs to allow prosecutors to look at the actions of the company and individuals 
within the company simultaneously and indict accordingly. 
: North and South, November 1997, 68 
R v Murray Wright Ltd (1969] NZLR 1069, per Henry J. 
;R v Murray Wright Ltd (1970] NZLR 476. The Court of Appeal did not believe the wording of s.158 allowed a corporation to be indicted for a homicide. 
OPP v P & 0 European Femes (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr App. R 72 ["P & 0 European Femes' ]. This case involved the Zeebrugge Ferry which sank claiming 
nearly 200 lives and established that the cnme of corporate manslaughter existed in the United Kingdom. 
The preferred way for corporate manslaughter to be introduced into New Zealand is for the law 
to be amended so that a homicide can be committed by a "person" which includes a corporation 
rather than by a "human being"6 . 
This paper will concentrate on three broad issues which are dealt with in separate sections. 
New Zealand's legal response to work related and mass deaths which have involved corporate 
negligence will be examined in the first section. It will be argued that our approach is no longer 
practicable given developments in other jurisdictions. 
The next section will trace the history of corporate manslaughter. The paper will then look at 
the recommendations contained in the United Kingdom Law Commission Reports7 on 
corporate manslaughter and critically assess whether their approaches are feasible in New 
Zealand. 
The final section looks at how a corporation in New Zealand can be held criminally responsible 
for its unlawful acts when death ensues and explores the likely impact of the introduction of a 
company being convicted of manslaughter. Also our approach to corporate criminal liability in 
light of the recent Privy Council decision Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v 
Securities Commission8 will be examined. The paper concludes that the attribution approach 
advocated by the Privy Council will enable corporates that commit offences and culpable 
individuals within the company to be held accountable. Then the paper discusses the 
circumstances in which a prosecution should be taken and the type of penalties which can be 
imposed. It acknowledges that the issue of whom to prosecute and in what circumstances is an 
extremely complex one as there is a risk that if corporations are prosecuted, individuals within 
the company will not be held accountable for their wrongdoing. The conclusion reached is that 
• Section 158 of the Crimes Act 1961 
7 
Law Comm1ss1on Consultation Paper No 139 (1994) UK Involuntary Manslaughter ["Law Commission Report"] Law Comm1ss1on Consultation Paper No 237 (1996) 
UK Legislating the Criminal Code Involuntary Manslaughter ("the Second Report") 
8 
(1995) 3 NZLR 7, (1995) 2 AC 500; (1995) 3 WLR 466; [1995) 3 All ER 918 (PC)["Mend1an") 
6 
New Zealand needs to review the issue of whether a corporation ought to be held criminally 
liable for causing a death. 
II THE NEW ZEALAND POSITION 
A. The problem 
The New Zealand public expect a response when there are mass deaths which have occurred 
due to a company's failure to safeguard members of the public and that response has been to 
convene a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the incident. 9 The problem is whether that 
response is still appropriate. 
1. Erebus 
On 28 November 1979 an Air New Zealand DC 10 which was on a scenic flight over the 
Antarctic crashed into Mount Erebus killing all 257 people on board. The Chief Inspector of 
Air Accidents concluded in his report dated 31 May 1980 that the probable cause of the 
disaster was pilot error. This finding was disputed by the pilots' families and a second 
investigation, a Royal Commission, was set up to inquire into the causes of the crash. The 
Commissioner, Mr Justice Mahon, disagreed with the Inspector's conclusion. In exonerating 
the crew he found : 10 
the single dominant and effective cause of the disaster was the mistake made by 
those airline officials who programmed the aircraft to fly directly at Mt Erebus and 
omitted to tell the aircrew. The mistake is directly attributable not so much to the 
persons who made it, but to the incompetent administrative airline procedures which 
made the mistake possible." 
9 Section 2{e) Comm1ss1ons of Inquiry Act 1908 allows "Any disaster or accidents (whether due to natural causes or otherwise) in which members of the public were 
killed or injured or were or might have been exposed to nsk of death or inJury Section 27 of Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 allows the Minister of 
1~st1ce to appoint a D1stnct Court Judge who has all the powers under the Comm1ss1ons of Inquiry Act 1908 to 1n11est1gate work place accidents 
Report of the Royal Comm1ss1on into the crash on Mount Erebus, Antarctica of a DC 10 operated by Air New Zealand (1981 ) para 393 ["The Erebus Report"] 
7 
The Commissioner's finding turned on the Flight Operational Centre's failure to communicate 
the correct co-ordinates to the pilots. In his view no individuals, including the Flight 
Operations Centre staff, were responsible. Rather it was poor administration systems which 
made the incident possible. Mr Justice Mahon's report was highly critical of airline 
management who he accused of being involved in "a pre-determined plan of deception" and "an 
orchestrated litany oflies." 11 He also criticised the adversarial stance adopted by the airline at 
the Inquiry of"ascribing total culpability to the air crew."
12 
Air New Zealand was understandably unhappy about the Commissioner' s findings and sought 
to have them set aside. The Court of Appeal ruled that whilst the conspiracy findings were 
unjustified, there was no appeal against the Commissioner's findings and his conclusions 
regarding the crash must stand. The Court set aside the now infamous paragraph 377 which 
referred to "a pre-determined plan of deception" and "an orchestrated litany of lies" on the part 
of the airline but the majority of the Court of Appeal were not prepared to set aside any of the 
other paragraphs complained of 13 
At the time of this disaster New Zealand could only respond with a Commission of Inquiry. 
The criminal law did not allow, what in my submission would have been the appropriate 
response, the prosecution of the company and culpable individuals within the company for 
manslaughter. It is unclear why New Zealand has not debated whether a corporate can be 
convicted of manslaughter. A Commission of Inquiry is not always an appropriate response to 
public disasters and the law of homicide needs to be overhauled so that it reflects societal 
changes and attitudes. What may have been appropriate at the tum of the century is no longer 
appropriate as we enter a new millennium. Given developments in the United Kingdom the 
time has come to question whether a Commission of Inquiry is the answer. 
11 "The Erebus Report" above n 1 O para 377 
12 Appendix to "The Erebus Report" above n 1 O 
13 
Re Erebus Royal Comm,ss,on, Alf New Zealand Ltd v Mahon (No.2) [1981] 1 NZLR 618. 630 
8 
B. The Criminal Law - Time ror a Change? 
The first and only prosecution of a company for manslaughter in New Zealand involved Murray 
Wright Ltd which operated as a chemist shop. In March 1969 Murray Wright Ltd mistakenly 
supplied the wrong medicine to a customer who subsequently took the dosage prescribed and 
died. The company was: 
14 
"charged under s.16l(b) of the Crimes Act that on or about 29 March 1969 at Auckland 
it did by an omission on or about 13 March 1969 without lawful excuse to perform or 
observe a legal duty kill Cornelia Chermane Keepa and thereby commit the crime of 
manslaughter" 
In the High Court Henry J agreed that the definition of homicide in section 158 of the Crimes 
Act 1961 was not wide enough to include a corporate entity but that he considered the 
approach to be taken in the interpretation of the legislation was a different one: 
15 
The only type of killing of which the law takes cognisance is a killing of one human being 
by another directly or indirectly by any means whatsoever, but this does not wholly 
dispose of the question ... The killing referred to [in s.160(2)(a), (b) and (c) of the Crimes 
Act 1961] is ex facie a killing by a human agency. There is nothing in that fact which 
would necessarily exclude a corporation because in all cases of corporate criminal 
responsibility the responsibility is for the act of some human being. But it is a special 
kind of human activity which constitutes an unlawful act or an omission .. . to perform or 
observe a legal duty ... Corporate activities ... are acts or omissions of a human being or 
beings, but if such acts or omissions can also properly be held to be the acts or omissions 
of the corporate body which is the alter ego of the . . . persons who do those acts or are 
guilty of those omissions then there is no reason why the corporate body should not be 
"R v Murray Wright Lid (1970] NZLR 476, 479 
15 R v Murray Wright Lid (1969] NZLR 1069, 1071 
9 
held to be responsible. 
Over 20 years later this dictum was quoted with approval and applied in P & 0 European 
Ferries by Mr Justice Turner to help establish in the United Kingdom that a corporation could 
be found guilty of manslaughter. 
Henry J suggested that if manslaughter in English Law is the unlawful killing of one human 
being by another human being, and if the person who is the embodiment of the corporation was 
acting on its behalf when he or she carried out the act or omission that caused the death, then 
the company as well as the individual can be found guilty of manslaughter. This observation 
encapsulates what corporate manslaughter is all about, holding the corporation and the people 
in the corporation who were responsible for the death accountable. 
When the case went to trial the jury was unable to agree on a verdict and it was thought 
prudent before the second trial was held to seek the view of the Court of Appeal as to whether 
a corporation could be tried for manslaughter. The Court of Appeal held that it could not be 
and quashed the indictment. 16 Their conclusion was that the definition of homicide in section 
158 of the Crimes Act 1961: "Homicide is the killing of a human being by another directly or 
indirectly by any means whatsoever" was not wide enough to include a corporation. 
17 
The Appeal Court judges were not opposed to the concept of corporate criminal liability 
recognising its emergence in other jurisdictions but they were unanimous that the use of the 
word "human being" as opposed to "person" 18 in the Crimes Act 1961 prevented a company 
"R v Murray Wnght Lid (1970] NZLR 476. 
17 
Counsel for the accused Mr Davison QC argued forcibly that the words of the New Zealand statute proscribed an 1nd1ctment for corporate manslaughter unlike 
s 194(1) of the Canadian Crimes Act which prov,ded that a person commrts hom,c,de when, directly or indirectly, by any means, he causes the death of a human 
being. 
18 
Section 2 of the Crimes Act defines a "person· as "the Crown and any public body or local authority, and any board, society or company and any other body of 
persons, whether incorporated or not .. in relation to such Acts and things, as ,tor they are capable of doing • Moreover, s 6(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 
provides· In the construction of f!>lery enactment relating to an offence punishable on indictment or on summary conv1ct1on, the expression "person· shall, unless the 
contrary intention appears include a body corporate. 
10 
being indicted for manslaughter. 
19 
The use of the word "human being" as opposed to "person" in the Crimes Act is the stumbling 
block which New Zealand needs to overcome so that a corporate can be convicted of 
manslaughter. This can be achieved by a simple amendment which would allow the acts of 
individuals within the company to be imputed to the company and the company to be convicted 
of manslaughter. The prosecution of a company should not preclude culpable individuals 
within the company being similarly indicted. 
In order to understand why such reform is important it is necessary to look at developments in 
the United Kingdom. 
Ill CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER 
A. A Historical Perspective 
Historically it was not thought possible to punish a company for criminal wrongdoing as a 
company could not form the necessary mens rea, it could not be sent to prison and it could not 
be charged with a felony which involved personal violence. 
20 
Initially corporate crime involved a failure to perform an absolute duty imposed by statute and 
did not require the courts to determine whether mens rea could be imputed to a corporate 
body. In order that a company could be held criminally responsible for the wrongdoing of its 
employees and vice versa the doctrine of vicarious liability was introduced. Through the 
doctrine of vicarious liability individuals and corporations became responsible for each others' 
acts and companies found themselves convicted of strict liability offences. Workplace deaths 
tended to be dealt with by health and safety legislation which did not produce the same stigma 
19 
"The fact 1s that ~ would have been possible for a differently worded Act to make a corporation amenable to charge of manslaughter, but in my opinion such a 
charge will not be against a company as the statute 1s at present worded, except possibly as party under s 66 • per McCarthy J 484 "[T]he plain fact 1s those 
responsible for the drafting of the Crimes Act 1961 failed to appreciate that in defining "Hom1c1de" a company cannot possible be described as a human being." per 
Turner J 482-483. 
20 R v Cory Bros Ltd [1927) 1 KB 810. 
11 
as being charged with a criminal offence. Health and safety offences are strict liability offences. 
If the facts are proven, vicarious liability can be used to attribute guilt. 
1. Direct Uablllty . The Emergence of the Identification Doctrine 
As it became apparent that companies were committing serious crimes, for example fraud and 
manslaughter, there was a move in the 1940s to directly attribute liability to the corporate 
body. This meant that direct liability could be imputed to corporate bodies and is what is now 
known as the principle of identification. The three cases which established that a corporation 
could be found directly liable for a criminal offence without the doctrine of vicarious liability 
were DDP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd 21 , R v !CR Haulage Ltd 
22 and Moore v 
Bresler. 23 In the first of this trio of cases, which all involved fraudulent wrongdoing, the Court 
on appeal found the company to be guilty of fraud and rejected the argument that it could not 
impute the required mens rea to the company only to officers of the company. Lord Caldecote 
CJ said : 24 
" A company is incapable of acting or speaking or even of thinking except in so far as its 
officers have acted, spoken or thought . . . In the present case the first charge against the 
company was of doing something with intent to deceive, and the second was that of 
making a statement which the company knew to be false in a material particular. Once 
the ingredients of the offences are stated in that way it is unnecessary, in my view, to 
inquire whether it is proved that the company's officers acted on its behalf. The officers 
are the company for this purpose." 
In the second case the company was held to be guilty of a conspiracy to defraud. Conspiracy 
to defraud requires mens rea. As vicarious liability was not applicable, the company could not 
21 [1944) KB 146 
22 [1944) KB 551 
23 [1944) 2 All ER 515. 
2
• [1944) KB 146. 155 
be held liable for the acts carried out by its agents, only the acts which could be directly 
attributed to it. 
In the third case the company was convicted of furnishing false tax returns. The returns were 
completed by the Company Secretary and General Manager to conceal their own wrongdoing. 
Despite that the Court held their acts were the acts of the company.
25 
When the second case involving a prosecution of a company for manslaughter R v Northern 
Strip Mining Construction Ltd2
6 was heard, nearly 38 years after the manslaughter indictment 
in R v Cory Eros Ltcf7 was quashed, there was no discussion on whether a company could be 
charged with manslaughter as the defence counsel conceded that the indictment could proceed. 
The issue had shifted from whether corporations could commit conventional offences to a 
preoccupation with the conditions of liability necessary to charge a corporation with a criminal 
offence. 
2. The Development of Corporate Criminal Llabllity 
a). Tesco 
The catalyst for the development of corporate criminal liability was Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v 
Nattrass28 in which the House of Lords tried to attribute direct liability to a company by 
looking at whether the company could be responsible for the price description errors of its 
employees. Tesco was charged under the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 for wrongly advertising 
the price of one of its products. Discussion centred on which senior office holders would need 
to be identified with the company for it to be found guilty of the offence. The majority in the 
25 {1944) 2 All ER 515. 516 - 517 per Viscount Caldecote CJ 
26 The Times 2.4 and 5 February 1965 
27 {1927) 1 KB 810, The indictment was quashed only because there was no precedent for charging a company with manslaughter 
28 {1971) 2 ALL ER 127 
13 
House of Lords approved the anthropomorphic dictum of Denning LJ m HL Bolton 
(Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd, 29 
"A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve 
centre which controls what it does . It also has hands which hold the tools and act in 
accordance with the directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company are 
mere servants and agents who are nothing more than the hands to do the work and cannot 
be said to represent the mind and will . Others are directors and managers who represent 
the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does . The state of mind 
of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as such." 
Tesco is one of the leading cases in defining the parameters for corporate liability yet the 
offence the company was charged with cannot be categorised into either a strict liability or 
direct liability offence. It was a hybrid wherein there was strict liability unless a defence such as 
due diligence could be made out. The ability to re-categorise offences means it is no longer 
possible to assume that the liability in regulatory offences will be vicarious. 
However it was not until the litigation following the Zeebrugge Ferry disaster in the late 1980s 
that the issue of whether a corporation could be indicted for manslaughter came before the 
courts for discussion . 
B. Establishing Corporate Manslaughter In the United Kingdom 
By the late 1980s, criminal liability could be imposed on a corporate body by vicarious liability 
(which generally means the offence is one of strict liability) or by direct liability for non-
regulatory mens rea offences committed by senior office holders. 
After Tesco it appeared all that should have been required to convict a corporation was to 
identify one of the company's controlling officers who had the necessary mens rea. However, 
2
• [1957J 1 as 159. 112. 
14 
the diversity of company forms and the myriad of defences that could be invoked meant this 
was not the case. 
1. The Zeebrugge Ferry Disaster 
In 1989, when the Zeebrugge Ferry sank because its hold doors were left open killing nearly 
200 people, there was no offence of corporate manslaughter. However, public pressure over 
the ensuing eighteen months resulted in prosecutions for manslaughter being brought against 
several individuals and the company.
30 P & 0 European Ferries31 was the third case in which a 
corporation had been put on trial for manslaughter. 
During the trial of those indicted as a result of the sinking of the ferry Herald of Free Enterprise 
in Zeebrugge harbour the trial judge Turner J had to decide the question whether the eighth 
defendant, the company that owned the ferry, P & 0 European Ferries Ltd, could be indicted 
for manslaughter. After hearing extensive argument that traversed two centuries of English law 
he determined that a company could be indicted for manslaughter and established conclusively 
that the crime of corporate manslaughter existed in the United Kingdom. 
32 
In summing up the developments that had occurred in English law since the Nineteenth Century 
as companies began to play an ever increasing role in society, he surmised that: 
33 
A clear case can be made for imputing to such corporations social duties including the 
duty not to offend all relevant parts of the criminal law. By tracing the history of cases 
decided by English Courts over the period of the last 150 years, it can be seen how first 
tentatively and finally confidently the Courts have been able to ascribe to corporations a 
30 
In R v HM Coroner for East Kent ex pane Spooner ( 1989) 88 Cr App R 10 the findings of the coroner who determined that no 1nd1ctments could be laid against 
the company who owned the ferry was successfully reviewed 
:~ "P & 0 European Femes" above n 5 
Prior to this the doctrine of corporate criminal hab1hty had not recognised that a company could be indicted for a felony as rt was thought a company could not 
receive the appropriate penalty nor form the type of corrupt mind required to do ant1-soc1al acts The advent of the 1dent1ficat1on doctrine changed this 
33 •p & 0 European Femes· above n 5. 83 
15 
"mind" which is generally one of the essential ingredients of common law and statutory 
offences . 
Turner J rejected defence counsel's argument that the inclusion of the word 'human being' in 
the definition of homicide precluded a corporation being indicted for murder. He concluded 
that "where a corporation, through the controlling mind of one of its agents, does an act which 
fulfils the pre-requisites of the crime of manslaughter, it is properly indictable for the crime of 
manslaughter. "
34 
In reaching this conclusion his Honour considered the dictum of Bingham CJ in HM Coroner 
for East Kent, ex parte, Spooner
35 who in overturning the Coroner's decision not to prosecute 
either individuals or the company involved in the ferry sinking had not ruled out the possibility 
of the company being indicted for the deaths and reached the conclusion that: 
36 
"[T]he inclusion in the definition of the expression ' human being' as the author of the 
killing was either tautologous or, as I think more probable, intended to differentiate those 
cases of death in which a human being played no direct part and which would have led to 
forfeiture of the inanimate, or if animate non human, object which caused the death 
(deoband) from those in which the cause of death was initiated by human activity albeit 
the instrument of death was inanimate or if animate non-human." 
He also applied the dictum of Henry J in R v Murray Wright Ltcf
7 that if a person is the 
embodiment of a corporation and acts or fails to act on the company's behalf causing a death, 
both the company and the individual can be found guilty of manslaughter. This dictum captures 
the essence of corporate manslaughter and is what the law needs to be able to achieve to 
control corporate risk taking. Unfortunately in 1970 New Zealand's law did not allow that to 
happen and there has been no change since then. 
34 ·p & 0 European Femes" above n 5.4 
35 
(1989] 88 Cr. App. R 10, 16. 
36 
•p & 0 European Femes· above n 5, 84 
37 
R v Munay Wnght Ltd (1969] NZLR 1069 
16 
Despite Mr Justice Turner's decision that the cnme of corporate manslaughter existed in 
British law when the matter proceeded to trial, the prosecution against P & 0 European Ferries 
Ltd failed38. The jury was directed that there was insufficient evidence to convict six of the 
eight defendants, which included the company, two directors and a senior manager. The judge 
took the view that the company's knowledge could be established by examining its director's 
knowledge through the test: if the ferry's hold was not closed, was there an "obvious and 
serious risk" that the ferry would sink? He concluded after hearing the evidence of company 
employees and those working in the industry that there was not an obvious and serious risk . 
As there was insufficient evidence against any individual defendant identified with the company 
to obtain a manslaughter conviction there could be no case against the company. 
C. Fa/lure of the Prosecution 
1. The Identification Doctrine 
The main reason for the collapse of the prosecution case was the strict adherence by Mr Justice 
Turner to the identification doctrine. It now appears that the strict application of the principle 
of identification, developed to find corporations liable outside the regulatory sphere is 
paradoxically being used by corporations to escape liability.
39 To counteract this trend and to 
hold corporates responsible for their acts, a systems-based theory of corporate responsibility 
has started to emerge which hold corporates responsible for the way they operate their 
businesses. The need for change was recognised by Lord Hoffman in Meridian Global Funds 
Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission
40 when he advocated attributing knowledge to 
a company rather than seeking out the "directing mind" of a company. 
38 R v Stanley and Others 1990 (CCC No 900160) , unreported - cited in the "Law Comm1ss10n Reporl" above n 7. 101 
39 
Wells C • A Quiet Revolution 1n Corporate Liability for Cnmes" [ 1995) New Law Jnl 1326. The first example of this occurred in Tesco and 1n what Wells saw as "an 
even stranger twist· that same appellant 1n Tesco Stores Ltd v Brent LBC [1993) 2 All ER 718 QBD. DC tried to argue that none of tts controlling officers knew that a 
video with an R18 classification had been sold to someone under the age of 18. therefore, the company could not be prosecuted This argument was reJected by 
the trial Judge on the basis that 11 was absurd to suggest the knowledge required for a conv1ct1on must be that of a controlling officer as if it was no large company 
could ever commit the offence. 
•o Meridian above n 8 
17 
A fixation by courts on requmng a suitable individual within a company to be guilty of 
wrongdoing often ignores "corporate risk taking" which has been described as the 
"corporateness" of corporate conduct.
41 This concept of corporateness began its life in the 
Sheen Report42 into the Zeebrugge disaster which was highly critical of P & O's attitude to 
safety. It identified a liability which was categorised as a systems-based liability and began a 
shift in focus from viewing liability as being either vicarious or direct. 
The emphasis in systems-based liability is no longer on identification of a culpable individual 
but on a company's policies or systems
43 to identify corporate blameworthiness. It tries to 
understand that companies do not always use their powers appropriately and that the criminal 
law can be an effective mechanism to control them. The advantage of this approach is it 
recognises that despite the shape and size of the company, a corporate culture exists within 
which individuals are required to operate and the blame for a particular incident cannot be 
confined to one or two individuals. This theme has been explored further by the United 
Kingdom's Law Commission,
44 the Privy Council45 and the House ofLords
46
. 
In the House of Lords decision Seaboard Offshore v Secretary of State for Transport ("The 
Safe Carrier "/ 7 the relevant statutory provision required owners of ships to take all reasonable 
steps to ensure that a vessel is operated in a safe manner. The House of Lords held the offence 
did not impose vicarious liability on employers for all the acts of their employees.
48 While the 
House of Lords followed the identification principle in Tesco it took an unprecedented step and 
suggested that the company could be liable if it failed to establish a system for ensuring that the 
ship was operated in a safe manner. Unfortunately because the prosecution had not led 
evidence on this it was not able to be taken into consideration on this occasion and the 
"F1sse B & Braithwaite J "Corporations Crime and Acoountabil rty", Sydney, Cambridge University Press (1993) 19 - 31 . 
42HMS Herald of Free Enterprise. Report of the (Sheen) Court, No.8074, Department of Transport 1987 
43Systemic failure was identified by the Cave Creek Inquiry as the pre-eminent secondary cause of the Cave Creek platform collapse in New Zealand. 
44Law Comm1ss1on Report and the Second Law Comm1ss1on Report above n 7 
•• Mend1an above n 8. 
•• Seaboard offshore Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport ("The Safe Carner") [1994) All ER 99 
47 [1994) All ER 99, 104 
48 
In Seaboard Offshore Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport ("The Safe Gamer") [1994) All ER 99, the DMsiona l Court had held that unless a senior employee 
knew that the ship had set sail w,th an inadequately briefed Chief Engineer the company would not be liable. This reasoning was also upheld by the House of Lords. 
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conviction was quashed. The Court signalled that in the future ship owners will need to have 
an appropriate safety system in place to avoid prosecution. This can only be of benefit to those 
they employ. This new approach should help prevent direct liability encroaching on matters 
that can be dealt with by the simple application of vicarious liability. 
2. Rejection of the Principle of Aggregation 
The rejection of the principle of aggregation in P & 0 European Ferries has made it extremely 
difficult to prosecute a company as rarely will any individual have the necessary knowledge 
required for a conviction. The Law Commission Report concluded that one of the reasons the 
P & 0 European Ferries prosecution failed was because the principle of aggregation had not 
been applied. In its view the: 
49 
"(P]rinciple (of aggregation) would have enabled the faults of a number of different 
individuals, none of whose faults would have individually have amounted to the 
mental element of manslaughter, to be aggregated, so that in their totality they might 
amount to such a high degree of fault that the company could have been convicted of 
manslaughter." 
In the United States this principle has been used to successfully impute knowledge or intent to 
a corporation50 . Company structures often mean that responsibilities and knowledge are 
distributed throughout a company and unless that knowledge is able to be pooled a successful 
prosecution will be difficult. 
G Slapper has argued that a company's knowledge should not be compared with the 
knowledge an individual has as companies gain benefits from being able to have many minds 
•• "Law Comm1ss1on Report· above n 7. 101 . The report also noted the s1m1lant1es between the aggregation principle and the civil rules which govern the attribution 
of knowledge to a corporation 
50 
Bergman D "Recklessness in the Boardroom· (1990) New Law Jnl 1108 
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pool their knowledge to devise corporate systems, practices and policies. A company benefits 
from an aggregation of knowledge and should be held accountable for that aggregation of 
knowledge51 . This approach is quite unlike that taken in Tesco which limits the responsibility 
of a corporation to the knowledge and actions of senior officials within the company. Anyone 
further down the chain of command whose actions are subject to the intervention of someone 
more senior was not held to have the capacity to impute the necessary knowledge to the 
corporation making it very difficult to secure a conviction. 
3. The Obvious and Serious Risk Test 
The third reason that can be identified as contributing to the failure to achieve a successful 
prosecution was that the confusion between gross negligence manslaughter and manslaughter 
caused by reckless acts was at its height during the P & 0 European Ferries trial.
52 
Subsequent cases have moved away from the "obvious and serious risk" test to that of gross 
negligence. This was allegedly to overcome the problems in the P & 0 European Ferries but 
it is in some respects a matter of semantics: if the failure to close the bow doors was not 
regarded as an obvious risk, it is scarcely likely that a person would be found grossly negligent 
for failing to close them. What the gross negligence test does achieve is to overcome the 
problem of finding a single person with the required degree of knowledge and instead opens the 
way for finding a company liable. 
53 
It is clear that in the United Kingdom by the late l 980's there was clear dissatisfaction with 
both the vicarious liability and identification approach and that there was a real need to develop 
a new model of corporate criminal liability that overcame the problems inherent in the above 
approaches. This was the challenge that faced the United Kingdom's Law Commission. 
:: G Slapper ·crime without Conv1ct1on" ( 1992) New Law Jnl 192. 
The Court adopted the obJechve recklessness test • what the hypothetically prudent master or manner or whosoever would have perceived as 
obvious and serious • and found there was 1nsulfic1ent prosecution e\lldence to Justify a conviction This test was based on Lord D1plock's definition of 
~~ecklessness" in R v Caldwell ( 1982) AC 341 
See Seaboard Offshore Lid v Secretary of State (1994) 2 ALL ER 99 and R v Kite & OLL Lid, The Times, 13 December 1994 
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D. The United Kingdom Law Commission 
Reports 
1. The Societal Context 
One of the precursors for change in the United Kingdom was the number of mass deaths in the 
area of public transport. In the last 25 years there have been changes in societal and legal 
perceptions to corporate acts and corporate responsibility when mass deaths occurs. Celia 
Wells attributes these changes to : 
1. Compensation now being sought for incidents which once individuals or fate would have 
been blamed for. 
2. Society's increased awareness of safety issues, and a general scepticism that compames 
always regard safety as paramount. 
54 
As public perception is changing so is the response expected by the public in cases where 
corporate negligence is apparent. The Law Commission Report was cognisant of this 
phenomenon when it prepared its first report on corporate manslaughter. It reported that there 
was: 55 
"a widespread feeling among the public in cases where death has been caused by the 
acts or omissions of comparatively junior employees of a large organisation, such as the 
crew of a ferry boat owned by a leading public company, it would be wrong if the 
criminal law placed all the blame on those junior employees and did not fix 
responsibility in appropriate cases on their employers who are operating and profiting 
from the service being provided to the public." 
::Wells Celia "Corporate Manslaughter. A Cultural and Legal Form· (1996) http /MWWCamlaw.rutgers.edu/pubilca!lons/cnmlawforumlvol6 num/wells.html. 
"Law Comm1ss10n Report· above n 7. 89. 
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The New Zealand public has also expressed similar concerns indicating the issues 
raised in the United Kingdom Law Commission Reports need to be considered here. 
If, as I have suggested, the aim of any prosecution should be the indictment of both 
the company and culpable individuals within the company for the offence of 
manslaughter, then the approach initially advocated by the Law Commission in its first 
report is preferable. 
2. The First Report 
The Law Commission's 1994 Report concluded that the adoption of a gross negligence 
formula56 would overcome the need to establish or identify any particular officer of the 
company as having the mens rea required for the offence and allows the emphasis to be placed 
on a company's attitude to safety. 57 This was to help ameliorate public concern that junior 
employees who were seen as dispensable by their employers would become scapegoats and the 
organisational problems that had allowed the tragedy to occur would go unchecked. 
The Commission's view was that it was necessary for criminal and regulatory systems to co-
exist as the safety of workers could only be achieved by the day-to-day enforcement of safety 
requirements, not by one or two criminal prosecutions each year. The Jaw of manslaughter 
should apply to both individuals and corporations
58 but that only the company should be 
indicted. It did not see it was also necessary to prosecute or incarcerate any 
56 In R v Prent,ce [1993) WLR 927 the professional conduct of three doctors was examined but only that of Dr Adomako was found to be far below what could be 
expected of an anaesthetist Therefore following Prentice the Commission considered the expression ·gross· negligence to be ·vague and undefined" and 
formulated a two stage test This test 1s discussed Oller the page. Subsequently Dr Adomako appealed and the difficutties have been qualified by the introduction of 
the following test for gross negligence "The Jury will have to decide whether the extent to which the defendant's conduct departed from the proper standard of care 
incumbent upon him, ... , and was such that 1t should be Judged criminal· [1995) 1 AC 171 at 187 New Zealand has adopted a s1m1lar approach see above n 1 
57 
The recent adoption of the gross negligence approach undoubtedly helped bring about the first successful prosecution of a company in R v Kite and OLL Ltd; The 
Times , 13 December 1994 in which a jury found the outdoor company which ran an outdoors pursuits course guitty of the manslaughter of 4 school students whose 
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canoes capsized in the English Channel The students were found to be ill-equipped and the expedttion leaders W!lhout the necessary expertise to lead an 7 
: ped1tion of that type. 
The Comm1ss1on was aware but choose not to adopt proposals outlined by F1sse B & Bratthwa1te J 1n the "Allocation of Respons1bilrty for Corporate Crime 
lnd1v1dualism. Collect1111sm and Accountability" (1988) 11 Sydney LR 468 which advocated a completely new legal regime for corporations 1n which liabiltty would be 
determined by the steps taken by the company after the accident to prevent a reoccurrence. 
company officials. 
This is problematic because if company officials are able to evade prosecution there is little 
incentive for them to change their behaviour and the criminal law will have failed to modify 
errant behaviour. 
The corporate liability advocated in the case of manslaughter was that the
59 
"crime of neglect or omission, albeit neglect or omission occurring in a context of serious 
(objective) culpability. It is in our view much easier to say that a corporation, as such, 
has failed to do something, or has failed to meet a particular standard of conduct than it is 
to say that a corporation has done a positive act, or has entertained a particular subjective 
state of mind." 
This stance is further evidence of the criminal law not being applied as readily to corporate 
crime as to an individual's wrongdoing
60 because the criminal law requires mens rea or 
conscious intention on the part of the wrongdoer. Risk taking cannot be applied as readily to 
corporate actions as to human behaviour. 
3. The Proposed Test 
It was no longer thought appropriate to label the behaviour as "gross" negligence, instead the 
focus was placed on the culpability of the accused. The test formulated was that : 
1. The accused ought reasonably to have been aware of a significant risk that his conduct could result in 
serious injury, and that 
,. "Law Commission Report" above n 7 129 
60 
Bergman D "Weak on Crime-Weak on Causes of Crime· [1997] New Law Jnl 1652. reported that the police and safety authorities do no
t percerve corporate 
crime to be real crime and are generally reluctant to prosecute culpable companies even when a death has occurred 
LAW llt:jffAR' 
VICl RIA UNIVERSITY" OF WELLINGTON 
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2. His conduct fell seriously and significantly below what could reasonably have been demanded of him 
in preventing that risk from occurring or in preventing the risk, once in being, from resulting in 
prohibited harm.
61 
The first limb of "the proposed test would require . . . an investigation of how the company 
operates to prevent death or injury". 
62 The inquiry would then tum to look at the systems a 
company had put in place to allow its business to run and the way in which it had discharged its 
duty of safety. 
The proposed test would enable the operational structures of an organisation to be examined. 
The report gave the example of Drs Prentice and Sullman who found themselves working 
without adequate support in a system which allowed the presence of drugs which were safe and 
unsafe for lumber injections on the same trolley at the same time.
63 The Court of Appeal 
concluded that the two doctors' conduct had not fallen seriously and significantly below what 
could be expected of them but that it did raise questions about the hospital administration. 
Under this test even if the conduct met the standards of a particular industry it would not 
preclude a jury from finding the conduct fell seriously and significantly below what could be 
expected and that the industry's practise would need to be improved.
64 
The test would only be applied after all other sanctions, such as civil negligence actions, 
professional condemnation and the health and safety legislation, were considered to be 
inappropriate for behaviour which was seriously at fault. The purpose of a prosecution was 
seen as not to censure a corporation but to hold it accountable for a serious criminal offence. 
61 "Law Commission Report· above n 7, 123 . 
., "Law Comm1ss1on Report" above n 7, 131 . 
83 See R v Prentice [1993) 3 WLR 927. In R v Ramsted, 12 May 1997, CA 428/96 the Christchurch Crown Health Enterprise ('CHE') appointed a relatively 
inexperienced British registrar to be the sole Thoras1c Surgeon for the region It could be argued that the CHE's appointment processes rather than Just the surgeon 
where responsible for the death of the patients 
.. The evidence given in OPP v P & 0 European Femes (Dover) Lid [1991) 93 Cr App R 73 by both the employees of the defendant company and those in the 
industry were that they did not believe there was a nsk let alone an obvious one that ~ the Ferry sailed with rt 's bow door open 1t would sink This was despite the 
findings of a Judicial inquiry in the Sheen Report, MV Herald of Free Enterprise: Report of the Court No.8074, Department of Transport 1987 that "A// concerned m 
management from the members of the Board of Directors down to the Junior supenntendents, were gwffy of faun m that all must be regarded as shanng 
responsibility for the failure of management. From top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness .. • The Comm1ss1on behaved the 
two stage test would prevent such an absurd result occurring again 
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Under the above test a corporation could not find itself liable by accident but only because it 
chose to engage in profitable activities where there was a significant risk. Those responsible 
for the decision making would vary but would be able to be determined as a question of fact. 
The question that would need to be asked is
65 
"whether those responsible for taking these decisions should have been (not actually were) 
aware of a significant risk that those operations, either at their commencement or during 
their confirmed pursuit, could result in death or serious injury." 
With regard to penalty, the authors of the report believed that a monetary penalty and the 
stigma of a conviction for homicide would be enough to bring home to those who control 
companies the need to be a good corporate citizen. As the report ' s emphasis was on the 
liability of a corporation punitive sanctions such as imprisonment were not recommended for 
company officers. This means the deterrent value introduced into the criminal law by this 
approach would be minimal. 
The civil principal of attribution was favoured, which would allow individual knowledge or 
negligence present in different parts of a corporation to be aggregated so that a corporation 
could be convicted of manslaughter. The doctrine of identification would no longer be 
relevant to determine those responsible for decision making. If a company owed a duty of care, 
even if the breach of the required standard was caused by a number of officers, the company 
would still be found grossly negligent. 
66 This approach would mean that it would be possible 
to bring an indictment against a company if its senior office holders did not know what was 
going on as it allows the knowledge of several officers within the company to be pooled to 
enable an indictment to be brought. No longer would companies be able to hide behind poor 
organisational structures to evade a conviction. 
:: "Law Comm1ss1on Report" above n 7. 130 
"Law Comm1ss1on Report" above n 7, 103. 
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The Commission's approach is a good one which is readily able to be applied in New Zealand 
and parallels the approach subsequently taken by the Privy Council in Meridian
61
. The test is 
one which can be applied to individuals at all levels within the company and to the company 
itself It is broad enough to allow knowledge to be aggregated or attributed to the company 
and enables a court to take into consideration any safety systems, practises and policies which a 
corporation has in place. This approach is a positive advance that enables criminal liability to 
be imputed to a company by a court lifting the corporate veil and examining the actions of all 
culpable individuals within the company. 
4. The Report's Flaws 
One of the aims of the criminal law is to punish conscious wrongdoing. The major flaw with 
the report is that it does not always view corporate wrongdoing as conscious. Therefore 
administrative sanctions such as professional condemnation are thought to be appropriate in the 
first instance. The criminal law is viewed as a last resort in the punishment of corporate 
wrongdoing, despite the fact that the Commission ' s stated intention is to apply the same law to 
both individuals and corporations. 
The underlying premise of the Law Commission Report is that corporate wrongdoing is 
inadvertent and caused by incompetence so it 1s not as senous as offences committed by 
individuals. The irony is that administrative thoughtlessness can have just as senous 
consequences, it can kill , just as individual thoughtlessness can. There is no reason to treat 
corporates differently. A company cannot not go to prison but its officials can. The criminal 
law is supposed to be the ultimate deterrent yet a financial penalty as advocated by the Law 
Commission will not always be enough to convince companies to put in place appropriate 
•
7 Above n 8 
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safety systems that will prevent tragedies. The proposed offence allows directors to hide 
behind their company and the company only receive a fine if convicted. A fine may not provide 
much of a deterrent or incentive to a company to change its ways. A company can only act 
through its directors and senior management and they need to be targeted too. For a 
prosecution to be successful it must be punitive enough to bring about change in the corporate 
environment and encourage the corporate to have as its paramount goal safety not profits. 
Any transgressions should see not only the company punished but also the corporate managers 
and directors who were responsible for the act or omission that caused the tragedy. Smith has 
argued that the sole advantage of criminal prosecutions over civil ones is the ability to 
incarcerate and suggests that "there is little point to criminal prosecution of corporates except 
in conjunction with the prosecution of responsible corporate managers and directors ."
68 
E. The Second Report 
Fallowing consul tat' 
/ 
the publication of its 1994 report the Law Commission 
recommended that a trio of offences replace the crime of manslaughter, reckless killing, gross 
carelessness and corporate killing. A company would remain liable for the first two offences 
via the identification route but liable for the third offence only if "management failure" could be 
established. 70 In order to secure a conviction against a corporation when a death occurred it 
would be necessary to show that the company's "conduct must have fallen far below what 
could reasonably have been expected of them in the circumstances"
71
. In determining whether 
the conduct was culpable the crucial question would be whether the conduct in question 
68 
Smith SL "An Iron Fist in the Velvet Glove Redefining the Role of Cnm1nal Prosecution in Creating an Effective Environment Enforcement System· [1995] Vol 19 
fsnminal Law Journal 12. 
"The Second Report· above n 7 
70 
"The Second Report· above n 7 
71 
Ridley A Dunford L "Corporate K1lhng - Leg1slat1ng for Unlawful Death" (1997) Vol 26 Industrial Law Journal 99. 109 
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amounted to a failure to ensure safety in the management or organisation of the 
corporation's activities (referred to as a "management failure" for short) 72_ 
The report distinguishes between "management failure" and operational negligence, 
differentiating between the conduct of the corporation and the conduct of employees. A 
company can find itself being charged with the offence of "corporate killing" either alone or in 
conjunction with an individual who would be charged under a separate enactment because 
"management failure" can still contribute to the cause of death even if an individual's action 
was the immediate cause of it. 
The type of "management failure" envisaged relates to the employers duty to provide a safe 
system of work which is similar to the common law duty on employers to provide a safe work 
environment and health and safety legislative requirements. However, its scope is conceivably 
wider and could include the "failure to provide safe premises or equipment, or competent 
staff'73 . 
The Commission feared the use of the identification principle to determine liability for 
manslaughter would virtually make a corporation liable every time the acts or omissions of its 
employees caused a death. 
"fi · 74 spec1 c to corporations. 
Therefore it proposed a separate offence of "corporate killing" 
The proposal requires the elements of gross carelessness to be 
proved against the corporate without using the principle of identification. As a corporation 
cannot think like a human being it removed the requirement to find that the risk of death or 
serious injury was obvious to a reasonable person in the accused corporation's position. 
An offence of "corporate killing" eliminates "the legal requirement under the present Jaw to 
72 "The Second Report" above n 7, 100 
73 "The Second Report· above n 7, 11 O 
74 "The Second Report· above n 7 See clause 4(1) & 4(2) Draft ln110luntary Hom1c1de Bill. 4 -(1) A corporation 1s guilty of corporate killing if-(a) ·a management 
failure· by the corporation 1s the cause or one of the causes of a person's death, and {b) that failure constitutes conduct fa lling far below what can reasonably be 
expected of the corporation in the circumstances (2) For the purposes of subsect1on{1) abolle-(a) there 1s a management failure by a corporation ~ the way in 
which its actlllities are managed or organised fails to ensure the health and safety of persons employed in or affected by those act1111t1es , and {b) such a failure may 
be regarded as a cause of a person's death notwithstanding that the 1mmed1ate cause 1s the act or om1ss1on of an ind1111dual. 
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identify individuals within the company whose conduct is to be attributed to the company 
itself"75. Whether any jury would ignore the perception of risk that individuals within the 
company had if the proposal was enacted is still an open question. 
Corporate killing appears to be a catch-all offence applicable to both workplace deaths and 
deaths occurring outside the workplace which are caused either in whole or part by a 
corporation. The ordinary principles of corporate criminal liability are not applicable to it. 
In 1994 the Law Commission was of the view that a fine was an adequate remedy against a 
corporation for causing an unlawful death. This has fortunately been broadened to allow the 
court the power to order a convicted company to take steps to remedy the failures which 
contributed to the death 
76
. 
1. The Second Report's Flaws 
The proposals represent contemporary public views on the importance of corporate 
accountability and the British Government has indicated that they intend to implement the 
proposals.77 The Second Report is a bold step to criminalise culpable corporate behaviour by 
legislation. It attempts to overcome the difficulties in the identification doctrine when it is used 
to impute corporate criminal liability to manslaughter. The proposal is a pragmatic one which 
will make it easier to prosecute and convict a corporation and even recommends laying a 
charge in the alternative under health and safety legislation so that if a jury does not convict a 
corporation of corporate killing a conviction is still possible. 
However, it is not all good news. Wells has suggested that if an indictment can be laid easily 
against a company it is unlikely that the prosecution will pursue separate charges against 
75 "The Second Report· above n 7. 100 
76 "The Second Report· above n 7, 124 -125 
77 Wells C "Corporate K1/lmg" (1997] New Law Jnl 1467 
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individuals within the company. 
78 This creates a real risk that the company will become a 
scapegoat for the wrongdoing of individuals within it. No distinction should be made between 
risk taking that is inadvertent as opposed to advertent. This would not occur if the law of 
manslaughter was applied as readily to companies as it is to individuals. The criminal law 
should not be seen as a last resort. 
Also, a conviction for corporate killing may not be a simple as the Law Commission believes. 
If the risk is not perceived as "an obvious and serious one" why would a company devise a 
system to prevent the risk? It is suggested that a jury would be unlikely to convict a company 
of failing to safeguard against a risk it was not aware of, or claimed not to be aware existed. 
Whilst the Commission has recommended the introduction of a new penalty of corporate 
probation that will enable the court to make remedial orders, it still has not recommended the 
use of the ultimate deterrent in criminal law, imprisonment for culpable individuals within the 
company. In my view without this deterrent corporates will not modify their behaviour. 
The creation of a separate offence applicable only to a corporation is a move away from seeing 
the offence for what it is: manslaughter. If the focus is shifted from the wrongdoing of 
individuals to the systems operated by the company there is a real risk that the company
79 
"may come off more lightly as a result of the introduction of a separate corporate 
offence, than they would under a strategy of extending corporate liability generally by 
adding a third route based on a organisational or systems model." 
In reality there is a very fine line between operational failure and systems failure . For that 
reason it is preferable to charge both the corporate and culpable individuals within the 
78 Wells C "Law Commiss,on on Involuntary Manslaughter: The Corporate manslaughter Proposals Pragmatism, Paradox and Pemnsulanty· [1996] 
Crim L.R 545, 550. See also Foerschler A ·corporate Criminal Intent· Toward a Better Understanding of Corporate Misconduct" (1990) 78 
California Law Review 1287, 1290-1 who reports that in the US when 1nd1111duals and a corporate are Jointly charged Junes tend to only con111ct the 
corporate 
79 
Wells C "Law Comm1ss,on of Involuntary Manslaughte,- The Corporate Manslaughter Proposals Pragmatism, Paradox and Pemsulanty · [1996] 
Cnm L R 545, 550. 
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corporate with the same offence at the same time. 
What needs to be decided is whether to target th company through its directors or the 
directors through the company. In my view the later 1s preferable but it is important to 
_/ 
remember both need to be targeted. Wells has suggested that it is not always the company that 
the public wishes to punish but the individuals within the company that have shown a blatant 
disregard for the safety and wellbeing of others. She writes:
80 
"Accepting that disasters are more likely to trigger calls for blame, and for criminal 
prosecutions, it still may not be the separated and dehumanised company on which people 
have trained their sights . Perhaps it is the directors, those who take the money for making 
decisions which have far reaching implications for thousands of employees and even more 
consumers, to whom the blame is being attached." 
In my opinion attributing the knowledge of individuals within the company to the company was 
a step in that direction, it allowed companies to be convicted of manslaughter and the conduct 
of those within the company to be put under the microscope. The introduction of a separate 
offence that l_ooks only at systems failure does not achieve this. 
Statistics show that it is extremely unlikely that a company will be prosecuted under health and 
safety legislation in the United Kingdom for a workplace death and there is little reason to think 
this would change if an offence of corporate killing was introduced. 
81 
Wells has expressed a concern that a separate offence may "lead to more marginalisation of 
corporate killing rather than less". 82 To some extent marginalisation has already occurred by 
treating workplace deaths as accidents under health and safety legislation and there is a real risk 
that the introduction of a separate offence of corporate killing will only exacerbate that trend. 
80 Wells C 'Corporate Killmg" [1997) New Law Jnl 1467, 1468 
81 Bergman D "Weak on Cnme-Weak on Causes of Crime· [1997) New Law Jnl 1652. 
82 Wells C "Law Comm1ss1on on Involuntary Manslaughter: The Corporate Manslaughter Proposals. Pragmatism, Paradox and Penmsulanty· {1996) 
Cnm. L.R 545, 553. 
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Ultimately a separate offence under either health and safety or criminal legislation is not what is 
needed. Wrongful deaths need to be treated as manslaughter, investigated and proceeded with 
accordingly. A new offence should only be considered if a company cannot be convicted of 
manslaughter. Given the relatively few prosecutions to date I do not believe we have yet 
reached that position. 
F. The Prosecution o, a Company ,or Manslaughter 
To date the only successful prosecutions of a company for manslaughter in the United 
Kingdom and Australia are R v Kite & OLL Ltcf3and R v Denbo Pty Ltc/
4 which have both 
involved companies in which the directors are also responsible for the day-to-day operations of 
the company. This suggests that it is easy to obtain a conviction when the company is very 
small and the company structures are not diffuse. The prosecution of a small company is more 
likely to be able to target the actual perpetrator of the wrongdoing in conjunction with the 
prosecution of the company. In the above cases the director and the company were initially 
charged with manslaughter. 
The Australian company Denbo Pty Ltd operated an earth moving firm which was found to 
have been criminally negligent in causing the death of one of its employees. The company (run 
by a father and son) knew that its truck had faulty brakes; yet it allowed its employee to drive 
it. The brakes failed and the truck overturned pinning the employee underneath. 
Originally the company and one of its two directors were charged with manslaughter, however 
in exchange for a guilty plea from the company the charges against the director were 
dropped.85 The trial judge imposed a fine of $120,000 (the only penalty being a fine not 
exceeding $180, OOO) on the company in the full realisation that it would not be paid as the 
83 The Times 9 & 13 December 1994. 
84 R v Denbo Pty Ltd & Timothy N Nadenbousch (Supreme Court of Victoria, Teague J, 14 June 1994) 
•• In addrt1on the director faced two charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act (1985) for which he was fined $10,000 
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company had gone into receivership one month before the trial. 
The conviction of the company for manslaughter initially appeared to be an uncontroversial 
decision. 86 However, the extensive use of prosecutorial discretion in determining which party 
charges would be laid against and the fact a monetary penalty was imposed on the company 
that was not paid indicate that on this occasion the criminal law did not achieve its stated aim 
of deterrence, which is of paramount importance to deter future offenders. 
87 
The Crown has been criticised for taking the path of least resistance in proceeding with the 
charges against the company: 88 
"If company directors are able to reallocate liability during pre-trial negotiations onto a 
corporation, dispersing any penalty amongst the shareholders of the company, this not 
only diminishes the deterrent effect of the punishment, but ultimately shifts it on to those / 
who may be entirely innocent." 
In order to avoid the situation where either the company or individuals are seen as expendable 
prosecutions for manslaughter need to be brought against both the company and responsible 
individuals within the company This should prevent one being offered as a scapegoat so that 
the other can avoid prosecution. 
In the second case of OLL Ltd, the company and its managing director faced charges as a result 
of four teenagers losing their lives when they drowned on a canoe trip organised by the 
company. Both accused were found guilty on four counts of manslaughter, the company was 
fined £60,000 and the company's manager was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The 
company put profits before safety. Its failings included: no first aid kits, flares, or spray decks 
to keep out the water, not checking on weather conditions and employing inexperienced 
86 R v Denbo Ply Lid & Timothy N Nadenbousch (Supreme Court ofVictona, Teague J, 14 June 1994) 
87 Chestenman S "The Corporate Veil, Cnme & Punishment : R v Denbo Pty Lid" [1994) Melb U LR Vol 19 1064, 1065 
88 Chestenman S "The Corporate Veil, Crime and Punishment R v Denbo Ply Lid' [1994) Melb U LR Vol 19 1064, 1070 
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instructors. 89 This appalling catalogue of shortcomings caused the students to be in the water 
for over four hours before rescue crafts appeared by which time four students had drowned. 
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These two cases indicate that it is possible to impute criminal liability to a company in 
conjunction with prosecuting individuals within the company. In OLL Ltd the company and the 
director were prosecuted and convicted of manslaughter which in my opinion is the result that 
needs to be achieved when a company and its organisational systems are responsible for a 
wrongful death. As a result of the prosecutions these companies went out of business and no 
longer continue to trade. Ongoing public safety was not an issue. It is probably fair to say 
these companies are not the ones the public want to see held accountable, he large household 
name companies that have frequently shown a complete disregard for the safety of the public / 
and their employees and which continue to trade despite the havoc they have wrecked. That is 
precisely the type of company that has proved elusive to prosecution, "the big corporate names 
which people may want to blame are those which are most difficult to target under the 
identification rule ( or possibly any other)". 
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IV.A WAY FORWARD 
A. The New Zealand Dilemma 
Erebus was not the last time in New Zealand that a company and it's management managed to 
evade criminal charges. When a viewing platform collapsed -...at. Cave Creek near Punakaiki, 
killing fourteen people, the response of the Government was to again set up a Commission of 
Inquiry. It found neither the Department of Conservation nor its employees were negligent, 
despite the fact they had not acted competently or in an appropriate manner. The 
Commissioner determined that it was not within his brief to determine if any individuals should 
89 There is a full discussion of this case, including the evidence given at the tnal in Slapper G "The Corporate Body", Gazette (1995) 92/07 
"° Wells C "Co,porate KIi/mg · [1997] New Law Jnl 1467, 1468 
be prosecuted under criminal law. Instead the focus of the report quickly moves from 
identification of the dominant cause of the collapse (not building the platform in accordance 
with sound building practice) to the secondary causes of the collapse which included failure to 
provide guaranteed engineering input into the design, poor management systems and lack of 
inspections. There appears to have been no true accountability for the deaths assigned to the 
Department of Conservation which built the platform, despite the Commissioner's conclusion 
"that substantial systemic failure was the pre-eminent secondary cause of the collapse. "
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No individual or corporate body has ever faced charges over the platform collapse. This has 
been the subject of much criticism.92 It appears to many observers that fourteen young people 
can simply fall to their deaths because of a poorly constructed platform and no one is held 
legally responsible or accountable. 
B. A Possible Solution 
1. A Systems-Based Approach 
What the two Commissions of Inquiry indicate is that the deaths were not solely attributable to 
the actions of the employees directly involved and that underlying organisational dysfunction 
was largely responsible for the tragedies. 
Whenever there is a death for which a company appears responsible the investigation needs to 
look at more than just the actions of those involved, the company's operational structures need 
to be examined. The two-stage test proposed by the first Law Commission Report
93 permits 
this type of inquiry to be carried out before any company is convicted of manslaughter. It 
requires an investigation into how a company operates to prevent accidents and at the systems 
91 "Report of the Royal Comm,ss,on The Collapse of a Viewing Platform at Cave Creek Punakaka1 on the West Coast on 28 April 1985 (report dated 10 November 
1995) NZ77 
92Hunt G "Scandal at Cave Creek A Shocking Failure m Public Accountab1hty· Waddington Pubhcat1ons 1996, Auckland 
""'Law Commission Report" above n 7 
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it has in place to achieve that goal. 
The approach taken by the two Commissions of Inquiry confirm that the two stage test 
proposed in the Law Commission Report would have been appropriate for New Zealand, at the 
time of each disaster and remains equally appropriate at the present time. 
In the case of mass death New Zealand has resorted to a Commission of Inquiry which does 
not have the ability to punish the wrongdoer(s) . This is not a satisfactory resolution for the 
victims families and as has been seen the Commissioner's findings in the Erebus crash were 
reviewed prolonging the horror as Air New Zealand management tried to ensure the company's 
good name was untarnished. It is possible to prosecute a company under the Crimes Act 1961 
for a wrongful death but a conviction under those sections or under health and safety legislation 
does not attract the same stigma as a conviction for manslaughter. 
If a Commission of Inquiry indicates that there are systemic or organisational failures that 
caused a death then a further investigation needs to take place and those responsible need to 
face charges if their conduct is below what could be expected in the circumstances. This would 
require the intervention of the criminal law as a Commission of Inquiry's powers are limited to 
making recommendations. To ensure responsibility is apportioned correctly the post 
Commission of Inquiry investigation would need to examine whether the actions of the 
company, it's directors, senior management and employees constituted manslaughter. The law 
needs to be changed to enable this to happen. 
Currently in New Zealand the response when a corporation causes a death is most likely to be 
an investigation under the Health and Safety in Employment Act where the chance of a 
prosecution being brought is slight. 
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C. Health and Safety Legislation 
In New Zealand the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 ('the Act') deals with 
workplace accidents and deaths. Other jurisdictions have similar enactments. The legislation is 
regulatory and requires an employer's compliance. Prosecutions under the Act are the 
exception rather than the norm as the Act's aim is to educate employers and to bring about 
higher safety standards. When the Act was first introduced Courts were lenient but that 
'honeymoon period ' is now over and fines under the Act have increased.94 However the 
maximum which a company can still be fined for causing the death of an employee is 
$100,000.95 One of the reasons for this is that prosecutions under regulatory legislation are still 
considered quasi criminal and not considered as serious as those that are criminal. Further the 
language used in the legislation is rather vague, lessening the impact of strict liability. 96 As a 
result a charge does not really reflect the seriousness of what has occurred. Moreover 
Occupational Safety and Health ('OSH') inspectors do not have the same powers as the police 
to conduct an investigation. 
Prosecutions have dropped by a third for workplace fatalities at the same time as workplace 
fatalities are on the increase. It has been estimated that each year in New Zealand 650 people 
die as a result of work related accidents. 97 This is approximately ten times the number 
investigated by OSH, around one person per week and does not include maritime, transport 
and mining fatalities nor work related road fatalities or occupational disease. Figures released 
by OSH indicate a 25% increase in fatal injuries in the 1997-98 year from 1996-97. 98 
However, prosecutions for workplace fatalities have steadily fallen - from 34% in 1995 to 
16% in 1996-97 to a provisional 11 % for the year ended March 1998. These figures combined 
.. Department of Labour 1996 prosecution stat1st1cs indicate that the highest fine to date has been $30,000 
95Sect1on 49 Health and Safety 1n Employment Act 1992. 
;Part II of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 talks of taking "all practicable steps· to ensure the safety of employees 
NZCTU Health and Safety Update June 1998 This figure includes those 1n11est1gated by OSH plus those 1n11ollling water mines and air, road deaths and 
occupational disease 
98 
OSH, 1998 The state of New Zealand 's Occupational Safety and Health St,rtmg P "Deaths on The Job - The Number of Workplace Deaths 1s Rising but 
Prosecutions are dropping Is OSH Doing It's Job?" Listener June 6, 1998 
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with an average fine of $4,023 99 under the Act do not provide much of an incentive for 
employers to provide the safe work environment which is supposed to be the aim of the Act. 
The trend reported in the United Kingdom of a reluctance by the authorities to prosecute in the 
case of workplace deaths100 is also apparent in New Zealand. Whether this would be changed 
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by allowing a corporate to be charged with manslaughter is uncertain but it would send a ; / \ 
strong message to companies that the New Zealand public will not tolerate sloppy safety 
practices. 
D. A Law Change 
The law in New Zealand needs to change to enable a corporation to be liable for manslaughter 
when there has been a wrongful death. There are three ways in which this can occur. First the 
Court of Appeal can overturn its decision in R v Murray Wright, 101 second our current law can 
be amended so that a homicide can be committed by a "person" which includes a corporation 102 
rather than a "human being" or thirdly, a new and separate offence can be created specifically 
covering corporations. 
The second approach is preferable as it treats a wrongful death as what it is manslaughter. It 
makes no distinction between a wrongful act committed by a company or an individual. In my 
submission the approach taken in Meridian has overcome most of the problems experienced in 
P & 0 European Ferries and would enable a corporation to be convicted of manslaughter if 
our law allowed it. 
The way ahead is not easy, any change would require the concerted efforts of politicians and all 
those involved in the justice system. 
99 Department of Labour Prosecution S1at1st1cs 4 November 1997 reported in Horn et al Employment Contracts Wellington. Brookers 1991 
100 Bergman D "Weak on Cnme-Weak on Causes of Cnme· [1997) New Law Jnl 1652 
101 
R v Murray Wright Ltd (1970] NZLR 476. An indictment 1s unlikely to be brought against a corporation as the law currently stands to enable an appeal to be 
taken 
102 Section 158 The Crimes Act 1961 
E. THE ATIRIBUTION APPROACH 
For New Zealand the leading case on corporate criminal liability is the recent Privy Council 
decision Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v The Securities Commission103 which 
rejected the identification approach and suggested that "a combination of the general principles 
of agency and the company's primary rules of attribution, count as the acts of the company." 104 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal 105 had earlier contended that for the purposes of 
establishing the company's knowledge the acts of Mr Koo, a Director and the Chieflnvestment 
Officer were to be identified as those of the company. The Court followed the approached 
taken in Tesco106 whereby a company is held to have the knowledge of the person who is the 
"directing mind and will" 107 of the company. The Court viewed Mr Koo as being the alter ego 
of the company and held the company was bound by Mr Koo's knowledge of the acquisition of 
shares contrary to section 20 of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 even though its Board of 
Directors had no knowledge of the transaction. Mr Koo was not part of the senior hierarchy 
but he had the autonomy to buy and sell shares without direct supervision. 
On appeal, Lord Hoffman who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council concluded that the 
primary rules of attribution are a company's constitution, namely, its articles of association. 
These rules are supplemented with the general principles that apply to individuals including 
agency and vicarious liability. However, their Lordships foresaw that there could be situations 
where a particular rule of law excluded attribution '08 
"In such a case, the court must fashion a special rule of attribution for the particular 
substantive rule. This is always a matter of interpretation: given that it was intended to 
apply to a company, how was it intended to apply? Whose act (or knowledge, or state of 
103 Meridian above n 8 
104 Mend,an above n 8, 12 
105 Mend1an Global Funds Management Asian Ltd v The Secunt,es Comm1ss100 [1994) 2 NZLR 291 
106 Tesco Super Markets Ltd v Nattrass [1972) AC 153, [1971) 2 All ER 127 
107 From the famous speech of Viscount Haldane L.C ,n Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd v As,at,c Petroleum Co Lid [1915) AC 705, 713 
108 Mend1an above n 8, 12 
mind) was for this purpose intended to count as the act etc. of the company? One finds the 
answer to this question by applying the usual canons of interpretation, taking into account 
the language of the rule (if it is a statute) and its content and policy." 
The judgment indicates a movement away from anthropomorphism and the identification of 
senior individuals within the company who had the requisite knowledge and now makes it 
necessary to examine the functions carried out by employees at all levels within the company. 
Previously the criterion dictated that the person with the desired level of knowledge would, 
almost invariably, occupy a senior position within the company. 
In the end the Privy Council saw the ultimate test as being 109 
" ... a question of construction in each case as to whether the particular rule requires that 
the knowledge that an act has been done, or the state of mind with which it was done, 
should be attributed to the company." 
Previously the application of the identification doctrine had led to no person or organisation 
being identified who had the necessary knowledge to be held accountable for acts which were 
clearly culpable110 . This new approach takes into account the diversity of company 
organisational structures and is prepared to attribute the acts of individuals at all levels within 
the company to the company which means it will no longer be as easy for companies to elude 
prosecution as it was under the direct liability test. 
The approach advanced by the Privy Council can assist our understanding of when and how 
corporate criminal liability will be imposed. It suggests that the acts of a company are merely 
the acts of individuals within the company and the acts of those individuals are attributable to 
the company. Companies are diffuse beings. They range from sole traders to global traders, 
yet all have the propensity to commit criminal acts and they should not be able to avoid 
109 Mend,an above n B. 16 
110 p & O European Femes above n 5 
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prosecution because no individual can be identified who has the requisite knowledge to enable 
a prosecution to succeed. From a practical perspective prosecutions should be easier as this 
approach takes into consideration the wide diversity of organisational structures that exist 
within companies. A company can no longer feign ignorance about the actions of its agents 
and employees as it is deemed to have that knowledge whether it was aware of their actions or 
not. Constructive knowledge not actual knowledge is what is important. 
The most significant aspect of Meridian is that, providing a statute allows a company to be 
convicted of manslaughter, the acts of individuals at all levels within a company can be used to 
impute criminal liability to a company. 
F. The Application or Attributed Liability 
In both New Zealand and the United Kingdom the attribution approach to corporate criminal 
liability is applicable to both criminal offences and offences committed under health and safety 
legislation. 111 To date in New Zealand Meridian has only been argued in two interlocutory 
matters that have involved criminal charges against the same company. 
In R v Tranz Rail Ltcf 12 Tranz Rail was charged under sections 145 and 156 of the Crimes Act 
1961 and made an application to be discharged under section 34 7 of the Crimes Act 1961. 
This case concerned a child who had been travelling on one of the accused's trains who was 
seriously injured when a safety rail on a viewing platform between the carriages gave way. 
Doogue J applied the attribution test in respect of both acts and omissions carried out by the 
company. In discharging the company in respect of the indictment for criminal nuisance he held 
that: I l3 
111 Previously the identification approach exemplified in Tesco had been applied to determine corporate liability See Department of Labour v Winston Jacob 
19/9/94, Morns J, Auckland AP 170/94 
112 (15 December 1996) unreported, High Court. Wellington Registry, T1/96 
113 R v Tranz Rail Ltd (19 January 1996) unreported, High Court, Wellington 12-15 
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There was no evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that there was an inadequate 
safety audit system as alleged by the Crown. There is no suggestion the accused knew of 
the dangers. What is said is that it should have done so. The omission relied upon in this 
case is not the absence of handrails, where the consequences may be obvious, but a failure 
to have a system of checks which may have identified the unsafe, unauthorised system 
adopted for the attachment of handrails to rolling stock, of which the accused had no 
knowledge. 
The next case involved an interlocutory application by Tranz Rail for further particulars in 
which Gallen J held that he was bound by the Privy Council decision in Meridian . The main 
reason he was prepared to order further particulars was "that the accused is a corporation and 
questions arise as to the basis on which it is contended corporate liability arises as distinct from 
the position of individuals." 114 
Further particulars were required to be given about how Tranz Rail omitted to provide or 
maintain its safety systems which were alleged to be defective. However, His Honor refused to 
make an order requiring further particulars which would give the names of persons and the 
specific obligations that they had allegedly failed to meet, as it was possible post Meridian for a 
defence to be brought without that degree of information. He held that: 115 
The further particulars should be expanded to include in what respects it is contended that 
the accused omitted to provide or maintain the systems which are said to be defective ... 
there is a distinction between cases of omission and commission, that the obligation which 
is imposed on the accused under the provisions of s.156 is such that it is sufficient for the 
Crown to allege that that obligation was not met and that it is unnecessary, indeed it may 
well be impossible, for the Crown to set out in such detail as to include the names of 
persons responsible for the implementation and devising of systems in the way which Mr 
11 4 R v Tranz Ra,/ Ltd (19 January 1996) unreported, High Court Wellington 5 
11 5 R v Tranz Rail Lid (19 January 1996) unreported, High Court, Wellington 10-11 
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Smith contends. In my view the decision of the Privy Council in Meridian is such that it 
emphasises that there can be an obligation which rests on a corporation itself and that it is 
for the corporation to ensure that that particular obligation is met ... actions or failures of 
particular persons were under scrutiny and those such as this where there is an overall 
responsibility on the company which it is the contention of the Crown was not met. 
The Tranz Rail decisions make it clear that in New Zealand following Meridian it should be 
easier to attribute liability to a corporation as the attribution approach does not necessarily 
require the indictment to identify the individuals who had the necessary knowledge or who 
failed to meet the imposed obligations. 
The Tranz Rail indictment indicates a new willingness to prosecute companies under the 
criminal law when their acts have resulted in members of the public being injured. It is a step in 
the right direction. The actions of the company hierarchy and their attitudes and policies 
regarding employee and public safety need to be examined. Managers who receive 
remuneration for making decisions about safety also need to also be held accountable as their 
actions or oversights can cause deaths if they put profits first. The current legal definitions do 
not allow this to happen and they need to be reviewed as there is limited value in prosecuting a 
company alone. 
Tranz Rail is a nationally based company, the type of company that has proved difficult to bring 
manslaughter charges against in other jurisdictions. In New Zealand companies can be charged 
with other offences when a wrongful death or injury occurs such as criminal nuisance and 
failing to operate machinery safely. Following the Tranz Rail cases it is no longer necessary to 
identify an individual within the company who has the necessary knowledge nor is it necessary 
to identify a director or manager who knew of the operational deficiencies in order to obtain a 
conviction. 
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A separate prosecution can be brought against either employees or directors if they were 
responsible for the incident or had responsibility for overseeing that particular sphere of 
activity. 
After Meridian to attribute liability to a company the fault has to be attributable to the actions 
of the company' s management or employees. However, merely prosecuting the company will 
not promote voluntary compliance with high safety standards. Lower level employees like 
pilots, deckhands and railway workers ' safety is often placed at risk by being required to work 
within the safety parameters dictated by management. If management is responsible for failing 
to create a corporate culture that has effective internal compliance mechanisms they also need 
to be targeted as this will be what ultimately deters individuals within companies from allowing 
unsafe practices to occur. 
G. Who to Prosecute? 
1. The Behavioural Perspective 
From a behavioural perspective it is difficult to prevent misconduct if only the company is 
prosecuted. Many individuals will have a personal interest in preventing a demotion or 
dismissal and pursue a course of action irrespective of the potential cost of litigation to the 
company. This risk taking behaviour can be explained in part by the low level of detection and 
prosecution of corporate crime. It is only when the potential costs of likely litigation to a 
company outweigh the expected benefits of its action or failure to act that a company has an 
incentive to change its mode of operating. 
Some individuals are risk takers and need to be controlled . Unfortunately shareholders and 
directors are not always able to exert the necessary control. In those situations the law needs 
to intervene. 
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The police rarely investigate or prosecute companies for poor safety systems, so a company' s 
managers may perceive there is little risk of apprehension or conviction. So the fear of 
prosecution may not be as great as the fear of dismissal if the company does not perform. An 
individual is most likely to be deterred if the pecuniary loss to the company exceeds any 
personal gain that he/she can reap. 
2. The Economic Perspective 
The Chicago School of Economics advocates punishing the company not the individual. It 
believes if penalties are imposed on a company that are severe enough it will take action to 
prevent conduct by its agents for which it would be ultimately responsible. This perspective 
enables senior managers to escape incarceration, and the burden of penalties to fall on 
employees further down the chain of command and on to shareholders and employees. 
It is only when the expected punishment cost exceeds any gains that there is incentive for a 
company to alter its behaviour. Bergman has suggested the imposition or risk of large fines 
may force shareholders to scrutinise a company' s safety record more carefully for fear of 
reduced profits. In tum this may make directors improve their safety standards.116 No longer 
would shareholders benefit if money is not expended on safety systems. 
3. The Company or the Individual? 
a) The Company 
What the Erebus disaster and the Zeebrugge disaster a decade later have in common is the 
willingness of the senior management of the respective companies to place all responsibility for 
the accidents on the employees at the scene who were seen by the company as expendable. 
11 • Bergman D "Corporate Sanctions and Corporate Probation· (1 992] New Law Jnl 1312, 1313 
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The Chairman of P & 0, Sir Jeffrey Stirling, publicly stated that he saw the responsibility for 
the disaster lying squarely with those on board the ferry despite the findings of the official 
inquiry which found management did not have in place adequate safety procedures. 117 This 
reaction was identical to the stance adopted by the senior management in Air New Zealand, 
who in Mr Justice Mahon's view, were prepared to hold the dead pilots solely responsible for 
the accident. 
These two examples demonstrate the lengths a company will go to ensure blameworthiness is 
not attributed to the company or to the senior management within the company. There is a 
willingness to sacrifice the "hands" of the company in the hope prosecutors will not go after the 
"mind" of the company or the company itself, "very large firms view middle managers as a 
fungible commodity that can be sacrificed as convenient scapegoats and easily replaced ." 118 
b) The Individual 
Conversely in smaller companies like Denbo Pty Ltd and OLL Ltd where it is difficult to 
distinguish between the acts of the company and the acts of the director, the director is more 
likely to allow the company to be convicted if it means that he or she does not face any 
charges. That was the approach taken by Mr Nadenbousch from Denbo Pty Ltd and one can 
only assume Mr Kite (who was sentenced to three years imprisonment) would have exercised a 
similar option if it had been offered to him. 
Corporate criminal liability needs to ensure responsibility for a company's actions are 
apportioned correctly. The dogged pursuit of low ranking employees as currently happens will 
not make organisations and those in charge of them behave more responsibly that will only 
come if the organisation and senjor personnel personally face punitive sanctions. 
117 Reported in F1sse B, Brarthwa1te J "The Allocation of Respons1b1lrty for Corporate Cnme· lnd1V1duahsm, CollectMsm & Accountab1lrty· Sydney L R 468, 497 
118 Coffee JC "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick" An Unscandahsed Inquiry into the Problems of Corporate Punishment (1981) 79 M1ch1gan Law 
Review 386, 410 Coffee argues that in America with the plea bargaining system there are economies of scale obtainable by simultaneously 
pursuing both the 1nd1V1dual and the company 
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Braithwaite reports that in pharmaceutical industry some companies have set up their structures 
so that there is a vice present responsible for going to jail. 119 This example demonstrates the 
extremes a company will go to prevent its senior personnel being held accountable. It also 
demonstrates how difficult it can be, especially if a suitable sacrificial lamb is held out, to 
determine who a prosecution should be brought against. 
c} The Company and the lndlvldual 
Neither a corporation nor an individual should be allowed to become a convenient surrogate in 
a prosecution if it prevents liability being attributed to those who should be held accountable. A 
successful manslaughter prosecution needs to be able to target not only the company but 
culpable officials in the company who were in a position to implement appropriate safety 
procedures and omitted to do so. This sends a strong message to those with the necessary 
authority that the failure to devise and enforce suitable safety standards will be at their peril. In 
my view ifliability can be evaded this will not be achieved . 
H. Penalties 
The ultimate goal of any prosecution needs to be to ensure that those responsible are held 
accountable120 . A company is often perceived as being responsible for the death but the 
prosecution of a company does not always punish or deter those individuals in the company 
whose acts or omissions have caused the death. 
The reason a penalty is imposed on a company is because its systems have failed to operate as 
they should. The sanctions imposed are to punish, rehabilitate and deter corporate offenders. 
Unlike the wide range of penalties available to a court in the case of an individual offender, the 
sentences imposed on a company have largely been restricted to fines . The imposition of a fine 
119 Reported 1n F1sse B. Braithwarte J "The Allocation of Respons1b1lrty for Corporate Cnme· lndMduahsm. CollectMsm and Accountab1hty· Sydney LR 468, 497 
120 Wells C, "The Decline and Rise of English Murder· Corporate Cnme and lndMdual Responsibility· [1988) CRIM L R 788, 798 Wells reported that the relat,ves 
of the Zeebrugge disaster did not want the ship level operators to take the blame for management's failure 
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on a company will not necessarily prevent recidivism for as Coffee put it "when the corporation 
catches a cold, someone else sneezes". 121 Punishment of a company with a large fine may in 
fact have negative consequences. If the fine is too high there is a risk that the company will go 
into receivership to avoid having to pay the fine. This could mean workers lose their 
employment or the cost of the fine is transferred to shareholders or the public. 
The literature abounds with sentencing options including equity fines, community service and 
dissolution122. However, the two most practical options are fines and corporate probation. 
Corporate probation cannot be lightly dismissed. It has been used in the United States since 
1987. This type of sanction targets those involved in a company's decision making process, 
while having minimal impact on shareholders and employees. For it to be fully effective the 
court needs to have a full pre-sentence report (perhaps prepared by a consultant) of how the 
company operates and how its operations could be improved. 
Corporate probation allows judges to compel a company to make changes to improve a 
company's safety standards. Unlike a fine which only has an economic impact on a company 
corporate probation forces a company to change the way it operates and punitive prohibitions 
can be imposed on management. Depending on the order made the company's reputation may 
be diminished in the eyes of the public. A positive side effect of all prosecutions is adverse 
publicity which can have a negative impact on both a company and management. Any criticism 
that emanates from a judicial source cannot be easily dismissed and the unwanted publicity can 
have a very negative impact not only on a company's profits but on an individual's future 
advancement. 
If, as suggested, both the company and culpable individuals within the company should face 
charges, imprisonment remains as a sentencing option. If a wrongful death has occurred then 
121 Coffee JC "No Soul to Damn . No Body to Kick" An Unscandal1sed Inquiry into the Problems of Corporate Punishment (1981) 79 Michigan Law 
Review 386, 401 . 
122 See F1sse B, Braithwaite J. "The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Cnme lndMduahsm, Collechv1sm and Accountability" (1988) 11 
Sydney L R 468. 
the ultimate deterrent available in the criminal law, incarceration, may need to be imposed to 
ensure that the penalty is commensurate with the offending. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately it will be a matter of political will whether the issues of corporate criminal liability in 
relation to unlawful deaths are the subject to review. The New Zealand Government has 
shown a marked reluctance to examine this area preferring to rely on health and safety 
legislation and Commissions of Inquiry. Yet as other jurisdictions grapple with the thorny 
issues of holding a company criminally accountable for their actions so ultimately must we. 
The two United Kingdom reports comprehensively cover many of the problems in this area and 
chronicle in detail the litigation surrounding the Zeebrugge Ferry disaster which was 
instrumental in bringing about reform. The United Kingdom's Law Commission chose not to 
examine in any detail the law relating to corporate criminal liability in other jurisdictions 
however, it would be unwise for us to make the same mistake. The United States experiences 
with corporate sanctions and the economic rationale underpinning their effectiveness need to be 
taken into account. 
Wrongful deaths are occurring in a wide range of situations and accountability is being sought 
from the law for those deaths. This can only occur in New Zealand if our law is changed which 
would require a relatively straightforward amendment. The law change is the simple part. 
What is also required is a prosecutorial willingness to investigate not only the actions of the 
company but individuals, at all levels, within it. 
Clarkson on a play on the well known phrases 123 suggests:124 
123Edward, 1" Baron Thur1ow Cited ,n The Oxford D1ct1onary of Quotations ( 4" ed. 1992) 69 ·corporations have neither bodies to be punished nor 
souls to be condemned , they therefore do as they like" Bnt,sh Steel Corporat10n v Granada Telev1s1on Lid (1981) AC 1096, 1127 per Lord Denning ·a 
corporation has no body to be kicked or soul to be damned" 
12
• Clarkson CM "Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning their Souls" (1996) Melb U LR 557 
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"kicking a few more corporate bodies and damning a few more corporate souls might 
stimulate the development of a few more consciences in those companies that have the 
lives and safety of their workers in their hands, and who operate in spheres that pose 
serious risks to the public and the environment." 
In order to achieve Clarkson's vision a corporation and individuals within that corporation need 
to be able to be convicted of the same offence- manslaughter. To do otherwise runs the risk of 
marginalising the wrongdoing. If there is a death the police need to be involved at the start and 
an offence under the health and safety legislation only laid in the alternative. Companies need a 
firm but fair approach and to know what the penalties will be, for all concerned if they get it 
wrong. 
Corporates need to be held accountable for grossly negligent behaviour. The attribution 
approach outlined by the Privy Council Meridian is an attempt to do that within the existing 
legal framework. Whether or not that approach can successfully be transferred from a white 
collar offence to the criminal law and the offence of manslaughter is as yet uncertain. What is 
certain is that : 
"Convicting companies of the same offences, established in the same way as those 
committed by an individual, is the best route to emphasising the seriousness of the crime 
and expressing the appropriate degree of censure". 
Introducing a separate offence of corporate killing may enable a company to be convicted of a 
wrongful death but so does the introduction of an offence of industrial manslaughter in health 
and safety legislation. A company needs to face the full opprobrium of the criminal law and be 
charged with manslaughter when a wrongful death occurs. It should not face this 
condemnation alone. Culpable individuals within a company need to be similarly charged. Our 
law needs to be changed to accommodate this. 
50 
A Fine According to Library 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books. -
_):/U ~ 3~g 
PUASf ,ETtJRN BY . 
3 1 MAY 2006 
TO 'vVU. INTERL,J:"f~ 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
i/1lf i11jmlii1ilill1ii11iiii 
3 7212 00584873 2 

